Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Should Judges Be More Like Politicians? by Schotland, Roy A.
Georgetown University Law Center 
Scholarship @ GEORGETOWN LAW 
2002 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: Should Judges Be More 
Like Politicians? 
Roy A. Schotland 
Georgetown University Law Center, schotlan@law.georgetown.edu 
 
This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any 
means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the 
express written consent of the American Bar Association. 
 
This paper can be downloaded free of charge from: 
https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/198 
 
41 Judges' J. 7-10 (2002) 
This open-access article is brought to you by the Georgetown Law Library. Posted with permission of the author. 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub 
 Part of the Judges Commons, and the Law and Politics Commons 
GEORGETOWN LAW 
Faculty Publications 
 
 
 
 
 
February 2010 
 
 
 
Republican Party of Minnesota v. White: 
Should Judges Be More Like Politicians?* 
 
 
 
41 Judges' J. 7-10 (2002) 
 
Roy A. Schotland 
Professor of Law 
Georgetown University Law Center 
schotlan@law.georgetown.edu 
 
 
This paper can be downloaded without charge from: 
Scholarly Commons:  http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/facpub/198/ 
 
Posted with permission of the author 
* This information or any portion thereof may not be copied or disseminated in any form or by any 
means or downloaded or stored in an electronic database or retrieval system without the express 
written consent of the American Bar Association. 
HeinOnline -- 41 Judges J. 7 2002
Republican Party of 
Minnesota v. White 
Should Judges Be More Like Politicians? 
By Roy A. Schotland 
The Supreme Court's decision in Republican Party of Minnesota v. White shows how unrealistic five justices can be about what happens in judicial eJec-
tion campaigns, and also--ironically-about how much 
judges differ from legislators and others who run for 
office. This reality ,vas captured concisely by Robert 
Hirshon, immediate past president of the American Bar 
Association (ABA) in his statement following the Court's 
ruling: "This is a bad decision. It will open a Pandora's 
Box .... " The decision will change judicial election cam-
paigns in such a way that the quality of the pool of candi-
dates for the bench will likely diminish, good judges will 
be less willing to seek reelection, and the public's cynical 
view that judges are merely "another group of politicians" 
will gain further impetus. This will directly hurt state 
courts and indirectly hurt all our courts. 
After noting the majority and separate opinions-which, 
un surprisingly, raise many questions-this article will pre-
dict what litigation lies ahead, then desclibe the current 
judicial election environment and prospects for reform. 
TIle White decision is not reducible to the simplistic, 
misleading proposition that ';Notwithstanding ABA policy 
to the contrary, the law of the land now holds that the 
First Amendment trumps all other considerations when it 
comes to judicial elections."] Justice Scalia's majority 
opinion held that Minnesota could not prohibit a candi-
date for judicial office from "announcing his or her views 
on disputed legal or political issues.,,2 Although that 
"Announce Clause" has been law in only nine states, the 
decision will impact all but one of the thirty-nine states in 
which at least some judges face elections of some type, 
because all (except North Carolina) have canons limiting 
what candidates may say when campaigning for the 
bench. One limitation, as Justice Scalia wrote, bars judi-
cial c[mdidates from making "pledges or promises of con-
duct in office other than the faithful and impmtial perfor-
mance of the duties of the office,"-a prohibition that, as 
he wrote, "is not challenged here and on which we 
express no view.,,3 As for a third limitation, "[tJhe Court's 
Illustration by Thomas Gianni 
treatment of the ['Commit Clause' J precluding a candidate 
from making 'statements that commit or appear to commit the 
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are 
likely to come before the court' was, unfortunately, not a 
model of clarity.',4 Justice Stevens, writing for the four dissent-
ing justices, said this: 
By obscuring the fundamental distinction between campaigns 
for the jUdiciary and the political branches, and by failing to 
recognize the difference between statements made in articles 
or opinions and those made on the campaign trail, the Court 
defies any sensible notion of the judicial office and the impor-
tance of impartiality in that context.5 
Arguably, the most significant point of the m~jority opinion 
is that whether or not the Court "obscur[ ed)" the distinction 
between judicial and nonjudicial elections, it did not ignore it. 
It did not adopt what Justice Ginsburg, also writing for the 
four dissenters, called ';the unilocular, 'an election is an elec-
tion' approach.,,6 As an example of that approach, she quoted 
the dissenting judge below: "When a state opts to hold an 
election, it must commit itself to a complete election, replete 
with free speech and association."? 
The majority's opinion reveals that one or more justices are 
unwilling or at least unready to strike more (or much more) 
regulation of judicial campaigns: "Justice Ginsburg [attacks] 
an argument we do not make. [WJe neither asselt nor imply 
that the First Amendment requires campaigns for judicial 
office to sound the same as those for legislative office."s 
Of course, it is difficult to say how many of the five major-
ity justices would strike how much more of the canons, but it 
is hard to see why their opinion would have included any 
such limitation if all five agreed with what Justice Kennedy 
said alone. 
Justice Kennedy, who joined the m[~ority and also wrote 
alone, views judicial elections as like (or not materially differ-
ent from) nonjudicial elections, and so would strike aU limits 
on candidate speech. But he made two impOltant points about 
what can be done to meet injudicious conduct in judicial cam-
paigns: States "may adopt recusal standards more rigorous 
than due process requires, and censure judges who violate 
1 
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Judicial Independence-
Free Speech Means 
Impartiali ty 
integrity. A judge does not need to read or he instructed by 
a judicia! decisioll or canOll to understand the wisdom of 
this i ntrospectiol1. 
Judges, by virtue or their position, are subject to a num-
ber of ;·thou shall and shall nots.'· The ·'shalt" relevant to 
this issue is the faithful and impartial perforrnance of the 
duties of the office. The "shaH not" requires that a judge 
not make pledges or promises of conduct. From a common 
sense standpoint, a judge cannot remain independent when 
promises or statements are made that commit the judge to 
rule a certain way. 
By William F. Dressel 
\Vith the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Republican 
Party of AJimu'SO/(1 v. Whirl', the war of words expounding 
legal and philosophical positions has begun. The tinest 
legal minds will anaJyze and enlighten LIS on what i~ meant 
hy "communicating relevant information to voters during a 
judicial eJection," Clearly, judicial candidates are nOW 
authorized to engage to some degree in discussion of rele-
vant political issues. Until such a time. if there ever be 
such time, when a bright-line standard is established, r 
wDuld suggest that both sitting judiCial officers and candi-
dates address this issue from a practical common sense 
point of view honoring impartiality. 
It is not easy to maintain the dignity appropriate to a 
judicial office in these times. Conducting one's daily judi· 
cial life is not simple. Many judges must participate in 
elections. The proceedings that lead up to those elections 
require tbat judges speak knmvJedgeably and firmly about 
justice. Add to this the growing pressure on judges to be 
innovative and act as problem solvers, and you have judges 
engaging in acts or speech that open them up to criticism 
or questions. 
\Vhen a judge is elected to office, it is a voluntary com-
mitment (not in the mental health sense) to conduct one's 
persona!, public, and professional life in a career that has 
privileges and limitations not known to other profc~sions. 
The discussion about one's speech or behavior that each 
judicial officer should have with himself or herself is 
framed by looking inside oneself for the impartiality, dig-
nity, and independent components that make up judicial 
ll1ere is not just an outcry, but a demand that judges be 
full participants in society, which may result in conduct or 
speech tbat has the potential to adversely impact the dignity 
of the court. In that respect, isn't it interesting bov" judges 
and others who refer to liS use tbe generic "the court" 
whereby judges are Iden'ed to not as persons, but as insti-
tutions! Yet, there are Limes that the judge is acting or 
speaking as an institution. \V'hen seeking election, the 
incumbent tries to blur the distinction between the individ-
these standards." And in the most sig-
nificant step since White, the Missouri 
Supreme COUlt has acted along just 
such lines, as noted below. 
Kennedy also encouraged what is 
often called "more speech to meet 
speech": 
The legal profession, the legal acad-
emy, the press, voluntm'y groups, 
political and civic leaders, and all 
interested citizens can use their own 
First Amendment freedoms to 
Roy A. Schotland 
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protest statements inconsistent with 
standards of judicial neutrality and 
judicial excellence. Indeed, if 
democracy is to fulfill its promise, 
they must do SO.9 
Justice Stevens made the same 
point, adding that even official bodies 
like the defendant board in this case 
"may surely advise the electorate that 
such announcemenls demonstrate the 
speaker's unfitness for judicial office. If 
the solution to harmti:tl speech must be 
h b · ,,10 more speec ,so e It. 
Justice O'Connor, also joining the 
majority and also writing alone, took a 
familiar and simple approach: We 
shouldn't have judicial elections, 
because of the fundamental tension 
between judicial independence and 
elections. But she ignored reality-the 
difficulty of ending judicial elections. 
For example, Florida's voters in 2000 
("yes Virginia, there were other things 
011 the ballot!") overwhelmingly reject-
ed changing from contestable eJections 
for their trial judges, to the same sys-
tem of merit-appointment and "reten-
tion" elections that they have for their 
appellate judges (with voters deciding 
only whether a sitting judge will con-
tinue or not). The opposition to the 
change was led by the women's and 
minority bar associations; similarly in 
1987, Ohio voters overwhelmingly 
agreed with the opposition's key adver-
tisement against change: "Don't let 
them take away your vote!"I] 
The surest result of the White deci-
sion is (for a change) more litigation, of 
three types. First, there will be two 
kinds of lawsuits about the provisions 
limiting speech, the "Commit Clause" 
and the "Pledge or Promise Clause." 
There will be attacks on tbe facial con-
stitutionality of each clause, and there 
will be disputes about whether this or 
that particular statement violated one or 
both of those clauses. Second, there 
will be litigation over whether the sev-
enteen states that have chosen nonparti-
san elections for all or some of their 
judges can preserve the nonpmtisanship 
they prefer. Minnesota, like most or all 
of these states, bans party endorse-
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ments-indeed, the plaintiff who 
brought the 1;Fhite case was joined by 
the Republican Party of Minnesota 
because of this provision. Their attack 
on it was rejected in the lower comts, 
and the Supreme Court excluded that 
issue when it gnmted certiorari-but 
now that we have White, surely courts 
will be asked to revisit this issue. In 
addition, the nonpartisan states limit 
judicial candidates from announcing 
their own pmty affiliation. 12 Will that 
limitation stand up? Last, all but four of 
the thirty-nine states bar judicial candi-
dates from personally soliciting cam-
paign funds; also, most of these states 
limit the time period for fundraising. 13 
Will these limitations survive'? 
"'hite will figure, perhaps subst~m­
tially, in the next U.S. Senate confimm-
lion hearing of any nominee for a feder-
aljudgeship who is reticent about 
answering senators' questions regarding 
his or her views. Justice Ginsburg drew 
on several of the briefs for, as Justice 
Scalia put it, "repeated invocation of 
instances in which nominees to this 
Court declined to announce [views on 
disputed legal issues J during Senate con-
firmation hearings ... :' Scalia said that 
the majority "do [notl assert that candi-
dates for judicial office should be com-
pelled to ~nounce their views ... .',1-1 
Stay posted! 
Of the nation's 10,000 state judges, 
most still face elections of some 
type-contestable partisan or nonpar-
tisan, or retention. That's after a cen-
tury of major effort by the bar and 
good government groups for adoption 
of the "merit" retention system. 
"Judicial reform is not for the short-
winded," as New Jersey's great Chief 
Justice Arthur T. Vanderbilt taught. 
But true as it is that during the last 
generation voters rejected "merit" 
systems, perhaps we are entering a 
new era, perhaps recent changes in 
judicial elections will increase voters' 
willingness to change these systems. 
Meanwhile, don't we need to work at 
reducing the problematic aspects of 
judicial elections? 
Until 1978, judicial elections were 
as uneventful as playing checkers by 
mail. That year in Los Angeles County, 
a number of Jerry Brown-appointed 
trial judges were defeated. Then in the 
1980s in Texas, campaign spending 
soared. But the biggest change 
occurred in 2000 when campaign 
spending set sharply higher records in 
ten of the twenty states with high court 
elections, and nationally, high comt 
candidates raised 61 percent more than 
ever before. Also, outside groups like 
the Chamber of Commerce spent about 
sixteen million dollars in just the five 
liveliest states: Alabama, Illinois, 
Michigan, Mississippi, and Ohio. The 
"nastier and noisier" campaigning in 
2000 was more like nonjudicial cam-
paigns than ever before. 
The states that chose judicial elec-
tions did not want them to be like other 
elections. Their constitutional histories 
show that elections seemed less prob-
lematic than appointments, which 
seemed elitist and/or mere political 
patronage. But those states accompa-
nied judicial elections with constitu-
9 
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The impact of elections 
on iudicial indepen ence 
is amplified because so 
many states have such 
short terms for iudges. 
tional provisions unthinkable for other 
elective officials-like uniquely long 
temIS. The constitutions of the thirty-
nine states in which judges face elec-
tions of some type have an alTay of 
such provisions, unique to the judiciary, 
to accommodate the choice of popular 
selection with the constitutional value 
of judicial independence. In all thirty-
nine states (except Nebraska), judges' 
terms are longer than any other elective 
official's. In thirty-seven of these states, 
only judges are subject to both 
impeachment and special disciplinary 
process. In thirty-three states, judges 
are the only elective state officials sub-
ject to requirements of training and/or 
experience (except that in ten of those 
states, the attorney general is subject to 
similar requirements). In twenty-three 
states, only judges are subject to 
mandatory age retirement. In twenty-
one states, only judicial nominations go 
through nominating commissions; in 
six states, this applies even to interim 
appointments. Last, in eighteen states, 
only judges cannot run for a nonjudi-
cial office without first resigning. 
The impact of elections on judicial 
independence is amplified because so 
many states have such short ternlS for 
judges. Although temlS are uniquely 
long in some states (e.g., fourteen years 
in New York, twelve years in 
California), in fifteen states even the 
high comts have only six-year telms. In 
twenty-five states, trial judges have six-
year temlS, and in another nine, only 
four-year terms. One can't help but be 
deeply troubled by what shOit temlS 
may mean for non routine cases at all 
levels--for example, at the trial level, 
sentencing and mlings on bail. 
Of appellate judges who face elec-
tions, 38.5 percent have temlS of ten to 
fifteen years and another 60.6 percent 
have six- to eight-year temls. Of trial 
judges who face elections, 13 percent 
have terms of ten to fifteen years, and 
another 67.6 percent have six- to eight-
year temls. This pattern shows that the 
choice of elections, "while perhaps a 
decision of questionable wisdom, does 
not signify the abandonment of the 
ideal of an impartial judiciary carrying 
out its duties fairly and thoroughly."l; 
Thirty-nine states have recognized that 
far from fulfilling the historic purpose 
in allowing for the popular election of 
judges, any effort to treat judicial elec-
tions like other elections wholly under-
mines the judiciary's independent role. 
Their baltmced approach to the proper 
structure for an elected judiciary 
embodies the understanding that: 
The word "representative" connotes 
one who is not only elected by the 
people, but who also, at a minimum, 
acts on behalf of the people. Judges 
do that in a sense-but not in the 
ordinary sense .... The judge repre-
sents the Law-which often requires 
him to rule against the People. 16 
Five justices have decided that judi-
cial election campaigns cannot be kept 
as different as the states want. The 
Pandora's Box that Robert Hirshon pre-
dicts will be opened by the small 
minority of judicial candidates who 
simply want to win, and the dynamics 
of campaigns will show a race for 
media coverage and appeals to single-
issue groups. 
Keeping judicial elections judicious 
involves not only the First Amendment, 
but also the due process rights of liti-
gants. Further, as judicial campaigns 
become more similar to other cam-
paigns, judges will continue to become 
more like politicians and the public will 
view them as such. Do we want deci-
sions on the First Amendment (and 
other constitutional protections) made 
by people who are more like legisla-
tors, or different from that? If judges 
are more like legislators, won't that 
threaten the legitimacy of having courts 
review the constitutionality of actions 
by the political branches? 
Perhaps more states will end con-
testable judicial elections altogether. 
But meanwhile? First, what should can-
didates do now? Take advantage of 
what the Missouri Supreme Court 
ordered in response to White: 17 After 
noting which of its provisions would no 
longer be enforced and which would 
remain in full force and effect, it pro-
vided (to finish its less-than-two-page 
order) as follows: Recusal [which 
includes disqualificationl, or other 
remedial action, may nonetheless be 
required of any judge in cases that 
involve an issue about which the judge 
has announced his or her views as oth-
erwise may be appropriate under the 
Code of Judicial Conduct. 
This is an inspired step. It supports 
the overwhelming majority of candidates 
who want to campaign judiciously-
they'll be able to say, "} know what 
you'd like me to say, but if I go into that 
then I'll be unable to sit injust the ca~es 
you care about most" In addition, it 
enables any candidate whose opponent 
has stretched the envelope (with some 
variant of "I'll hang them all," or "I 
believe that anyone convicted of child 
abuse should receive the maximum sen-
tence allowed by law," or 'T m a tenant, 
not a hmdlord"), to respond with ''My 
opponent has told you what he thinks 
you want, but hasn't told you that he 
won't be able to deliver; he'll be disqual-
ified from the ca<;es you care about" 
The most important step in meeting 
the challenge was urged in May by 
Ohio's Chief Justice Moyer: Lengthen 
judicial terms to at least eight years. 
That single step will reduce the prob-
lems inherent in judicial elections, and 
will go far to enlarge and enrich the pool 
(continued on page 45) 
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Judges More 
Like Politicians 
(continued from page JO) 
of people willing to seek judgeships, 
and to encourage them to continue serv-
ing. And improving the caliber of those 
who serve as judges is obviously the 
goal of all refonn of judicial selection. 
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Perspective on 
Tensions 
(continuedfrom page 29) 
independence if pressure is a real or 
perceived problem. In Wisconsin, the 
supreme COUIt justices have a ten-year 
tenn. All other judges serve for six 
years. The public would be better 
served if all judges had ten-year temlS. 
Despite its flaws, the election sys-
tem has produced good, competent, and 
hardworking judges. Still, the system 
can be improved. For instance, an ethi-
cal code should acknowledge the 
increased number of lawyer couples 
and families in the legal profession and 
the advantage they enjoy in campaign 
fundraising. This fundraising advantage 
should be removed by permitting can-
didates to solicit funds, or by public 
funding of all judicial campaigns. The 
process must allow candidates to 
describe their philosophy to the voters 
while simultaneously supporting judi-
cial concerns over decisional indepen-
dence by lengthening terms. 
Judges Abroad 
(continued .fimn page 3 J) 
The commitment of willing volunteers 
and unselfish leaders is essential to 
bring the prospect of fundamental free-
dom and judicial independence to these 
trouble spots. Without promoting the 
mle of law in this region, there is little 
hope for the tj-eedom and development 
necessary to bring to it the tranquility 
the people there deserve. 
So although I will miss the chance 
to work with CEEU and the judges of 
Azerbaijan, I hope someday there will 
be a CEEU presence in places like 
Israel and Palestine. If given the oppor-
tunity to participate in progranls there, 
I would do everything possible to avoid 
having to write another article about 
why I was unable to go. 
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